UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

11-20-2014

State v. Villavicencio Appellant's Brief Dckt. 42198

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"State v. Villavicencio Appellant's Brief Dckt. 42198" (2014). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 5394.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/5394

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDA
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

OPY
No. 42198
Elmore Co. Case No.
CR-2005-2654

)
JOSE LUIS VILLAVICENCIO,
Defundan~Respondent

)
)
)

______________ )
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF ELMORE

HONORABLE LYNN G. NORTON
District Judge

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho
PAUL R. PANTHER
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division

SARA B. THOMAS
Deputy State Appellate
Public Defender
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712

RUSSELLJ.SPENCER
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534
ATTORNEYS FOR
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR
DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................. ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................... 1
Nature Of The Case .............................................................................. 1
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings ................... 1
ISSUE ............................................... .............................................................. 3
ARGUMENT ....................................................................................................4
The District Court Erred By Correcting Villavicencio's
Illegal Sentence In A Way That Vitiated The Parties'
Binding Rule 11 Plea Agreement ......................................................... .4
A.

lntroduction .................................................................................4

B.

Standard Of Review ................................................................... 5

C.

Idaho Criminal Rule 11 Requires The Sentencing
Court To Implement The Legal Provisions Of The
Parties' Plea Agreement ............................................................. 5

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................... 10
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ......................................................................... 10

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

PAGE

Bernard & Son, Inc. v. Akins, 109 Idaho 466, 708 P.2d 871 (1985) ................................ 9
Haessly v. Safeco Title Ins. Co. of Idaho, 121 Idaho 463, 825 P.2d 1119 (1992) ............ 9
State v. Allen, 144 Idaho 875, 172 P.3d 1150 (Ct. App. 2007) ........................................ 8
State v. Holdaway, 130 Idaho 482, 943 P.2d 72 (Ct. App. 1997) .................................... 7
State v. Horejs, 143 Idaho 260, 141 P.3d 1129 (Ct. App. 2006) .................................. 4, 9
State v. Jafek, 141 Idaho 71, 106 P.3d 397 (2005) ......................................................... 5
State v. Lampien, 148 Idaho 367,233 P.3d 750 (2010) .................................................. 5
State v. Steelsmith, 153 Idaho 577,288 P.3d 132 (Ct. App. 2012) ................................. 8

STATUTES
I.C. § 18-309 .................................................................................................................... 8
I.C. § 18-920 .................................................................................................................... 5
I.C. § 19-2601 ..................................................................................................................4
I.C. § 20-222 .................................................................................................................... 4
I.C. § 37-2732 .................................................................................................................. 5

RULES
1.C.R. 11 ...................................................................................................................... 6, 9
I.C.R. 35 ...................................................................................................................... 8, 9

ii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
The state appeals from the district court's order granting Jose Luis Villavicencio's
Rule 35 motion to correct an illegal sentence.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
In 2005, the state charged Villavicencio with possession of methamphetamine
and possession of paraphernalia in CR-2005-2654. (R., pp.25-26.) Villavicencio also
had multiple charges pending against him in CR-2004-2777 and CR-2005-2259. (R.,
p.29.) To resolve these cases, Villavicencio entered into a global, binding Rule 11 plea
agreement in which he agreed to plead guilty to the possession of methamphetamine
charge in CR-2005-2654, and to both an additional possession charge and a no contact
order violation in CR-2004-2777. (R., pp.44-45.) In exchange, the state would dismiss
all remaining counts and CR-2005-2259 in its entirety. (Id.) The parties also agreed
that the court would retain jurisdiction over Villavicencio with underlying consecutive
sentences on the possession convictions of five years with one and a half years fixed,
for a total sentence of ten years with three years fixed. (R., p.45.) After the period of
retained jurisdiction, Villavicencio would be placed on probation for ten years. (Id.)
The district court accepted the binding plea agreement. (R., p.48.) Pursuant to
that agreement, the district court sentenced Villavicencio to two consecutive unified
terms of five years with one and a half years fixed, for a total sentence of ten years with
three years fixed, but retained jurisdiction for 180 days. (R., pp.40-42.) Following the
period of retained jurisdiction, consistent with the binding Rule 11 plea agreement, the
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district court suspended the sentences and placed Villavicencio on probation for a
period of ten years. (R., pp.97-103.)
In 2013, the state filed a motion for a probation violation against Villavicencio.
(R., pp.131-34.)

Villavicencio filed a Rule 35 motion for correction of an illegal

sentence, arguing that his probation of ten years was illegal because it was ordered
concurrent instead of consecutive, and the maximum term for possession was seven
years. (R., pp.208-10.) The state objected to the motion on the bases that a ten-year
probation was the binding agreement of the parties, that if the agreement violated
Villavicencio's constitutional rights those rights were waived, and that, if the district court
erred by imposing a ten-year probation, that error was invited. (R., pp.213-19.) A new
district judge held an evidentiary hearing (see 5/5/2014 Tr.), and ultimately granted
Villavicencio's motion (R., pp.249-54). The district court then issued a corrected order
granting probation, reducing the period to seven years. (R., pp.256-59.)
The state filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.262-64.)
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ISSUE
Did the district court err when it corrected Villavicencio's sentence in a way that
vitiated the parties' binding Rule 11 plea agreement?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred By Correcting Villavicencio's Illegal Sentence In A Way That
Vitiated The Parties' Binding Rule 11 Plea Agreement
A.

Introduction
Following concurrent periods of retained jurisdiction, in 2006, the district court

suspended Villavicencio's consecutive five-year sentences, for a total underlying
sentence of ten years, and placed him on concurrent probations, each for a period of
ten years. (R., pp.97-103.) When he violated those probations seven and a half years
later, Villavicencio filed a Rule 35 motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that the
district court lacked authority to place him on probation for a period of ten years. (R.,
pp.208-10.) Because the maximum sentence for Villavicencio's crimes of possession of
methamphetamine was seven years, the state agrees that the maximum term of
probation which the court could order on either felony count was only seven years. See
I.C. §§ 19-2601(7), 20-222(1). The sentence, as constructed by the district court, was
therefore illegal and needed to be corrected.
But this sentence was arrived at through a binding Rule 11 plea agreement,
which required that Villavicencio be placed on probation for a period of ten years. (R.,
pp.44-48.) The agreement did not specify that Villavicencio serve two concurrent terms
of probation, only that he be placed on probation for ten years. (R., p.45.) That term of
the plea agreement, which was arrived at through negotiation, is not in and of itself
illegal and could have been accomplished legally by imposing two consecutive periods
of probation totaling a period of ten years. See State v. Horejs, 143 Idaho 260, 266,
141 P.3d 1129, 1135 (Ct. App. 2006).
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The district court erred by vitiating the parties' binding plea agreement, reducing
Villavicencio's term of probation to a period of seven years in direct contradiction of the
unambiguous condition of the agreement that Villavicencio serve probation for a period
of ten years. The district court's order should be vacated and this case remanded for
resentencing consistent with the binding Rule 11 plea agreement.

B.

Standard Of Review
Whether a plea agreement has been breached is a question of law to be

reviewed by the Court de novo, in accordance with contract law standards." State v.
Jafek, 141 Idaho 71, 73, 106 P.3d 397, 399 (2005) (citation omitted).

C.

Idaho Criminal Rule 11 Requires The Sentencing Court To Implement The Legal
Provisions Of The Parties' Plea Agreement
A plea agreement is contractual in nature and must be measured by contract law

standards.

State v. Lampien, 148 Idaho 367, 376, 233 P.3d 750, 759 (2010).

In

September 2005, Villavicencio entered into a binding Rule 11 plea agreement with
prosecutors in which the parties agreed to the following:
1.
That the Defendant will plead guilty to Count I of the
Information in Case No. CR-05-2654, charging Defendant with the felony
offense of POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUSBTANCE [sic], in
violation of Idaho Code §37-2732 (c)(1). The State will dismiss Count II,
Possession of Paraphernalia.
2.
That the Defendant will plead guilty to Count I of the
Information in Case No. CR-04-2777, charging the Defendant with the
felony offense of POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, in
violation of Idaho Code §37-2732(e)(1 ). Further, Defendant will plead
guilty to the Count VI of the Information, charging VIOLATION OF A NO
CONTACT ORDER, in violation of Idaho Code §18-920. The State will
dismiss all other Counts in this case.
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3.
entirety.

That the State will dismiss Case No. CR-05-2259 in its

4.
That upon Defendant's pleas of guilty, he be committed to
the Idaho Department of Corrections [sic] for a period of one and a half (1
½) years determinate followed by three and a half (3 ½) years
indeterminate, PER FELONY COUNT, for a total sentence of ten (10)
years, said sentence being suspended, with the Court retaining
jurisdiction.
Additionally, Defendant shall serve 180 days for the
misdemeanor charge, said sentence to run concurrent with the retained
jurisdiction.
5.
Upon successful completion of the retained jurisdiction,
Defendant be placed upon supervised probation for a period of ten (10)
years ....
(R., pp.44-45.)

The district court accepted the binding plea agreement.

(R., p.48.)

Under Rule 11, this bound the district court to "implement the disposition provided for in
the plea agreement." I.C.R. 11 (f)(3).
In 2006, the district court attempted to sentence Villavicencio to probation for a
period of ten years consistent with the parties' agreement. But the district court had a
concern. It explained to the parties:
Counsel, one thing I want to make clear on the record for
somebody who may be reviewing this in the future, that the parties agreed
with regard to the sentencing in this matter, that the Court would impose a
1 ½ year fixed and 3 ½ year indeterminate in these cases and that those
sentences would be concurrent. That of course is a five year sentence.
But the parties, in return for the Rider and the promise that the State
would go along with probation if the defendant was successful on that
Rider, agreed to a 10-year probation. Technically in the absence of that
agreement, the Court would not have an ability to impose a 10-year
probation because that would be considered a blended sentence of the
putting together a concurrent and a consecutive term. But the Court
believes, because this was done pursuant to a plea agreement, that it can
impose a 10-year probation because of the fact that it could have at the
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time of sentencing imposed a sentence of up to 10 years by making the
sentences consecutive, and the parties granted the Court authority to do
that.
I will put that on the record so it is clear why the Court imposed a
10-year probation on two concurrent five-year terms.
(R., p.215; see also 3/6/2006 Tr., p.7, L.4 - p.8, L.3.) Thus, based on its belief that it
had originally ordered Villavicencio's sentences to run concurrently with one another,
and recognizing that the sentence would technically be illegal-even if the negotiated
condition that Villavicencio serve probation for a period of ten years was not-the
district court placed Villavicencio on concurrent probations for a period of ten years.
(R., pp.99-104.)
But the district court's underlying premise, that the original sentences were

concurrent, was mistaken. In fact, the underlying sentences agreed to by the parties
and imposed by the district court were consecutive sentences, totaling a period of ten
years.

(R., pp.42, 45.)

The district court therefore could have correctly sentenced

Villavicencio to consecutive probations which together totaled ten years, consistent with
the parties' agreement.
The district court's factual error in 2006 did not relieve it of its duty to "implement
the disposition provided for in the plea agreement" when Villavicencio finally challenged
his sentence in 2014.

A defendant is not permitted to retain the benefits of a plea

agreement while at the same time disclaiming aspects that benefit the state. State v.
Holdaway, 130 Idaho 482,484, 943 P.2d 72, 74 (Ct. App. 1997). The state is entitled to
receive the reciprocal benefit of its bargain, too. !si, And the district court, obligated by
Rule 11 to ensure that each party receive the benefit of their plea bargain, had the
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authority to correct the sentence's illegality in a way that "implement[ed] the disposition
provided for in the plea agreement." Instead of vitiating the plea agreement to remove
the illegality, the district court should have resentenced Villavicencio and corrected the
illegality in a manner consistent with the agreement.
But the district court was reluctant, opining that State v. Allen, 144 Idaho 875,
172 P.3d 1150 (Ct. App. 2007), prohibited it from correcting the sentence in this case.
(5/5/2014 Tr., p.8, L.3 - p.9, L.6.)

In Allen, the Court of Appeals held that "[o]nce

sentence has been pronounced without mention of prejudgment incarceration ... the
court may ,not increase that sentence by issuing a subsequent judgment or amended
judgment" under Idaho Criminal Rule 36 "that withholds credit mandated by I.C. § 18309."

kl at 878,

172 P.3d at 1153. The Court's holding in Allen is inapplicable. First,

credit for time served is not at issue. Second, unlike Allen, correcting Villavicencio's
sentence so that it is both legal and consistent with the parties' negotiated agreement
does not require that the court "increase [Villavicencio's] sentence by issuing a
subsequent judgment or amended judgment."
Allen does not prohibit the district court from correcting Villavicencio's illegally
structured sentence, and doing so in a way that implements the terms of the parties'
negotiated binding plea agreement. First, converting two concurrent probations, each
for a period of ten years, to two consecutive probations totaling a single term of ten
years does not "increase the sentence."

But even if it did, the Court has recently

explained that where additions to a sentence are mandatory and necessary to correct
an illegal sentence, such alterations are within a court's authority under Idaho Criminal
Rule 35(a).

State v. Steelsmith, 153 Idaho 577, 582, 288 P.3d 132, 137 (Ct. App.
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2012). Because upon accepting a negotiated plea agreement the district court is bound
under Rule 11 to "implement the disposition provided for in the plea agreement," the
condition that Villavicencio be placed on probation for a period of ten years is in fact
mandatory, and the district court is authorized to correct the sentence in order to
implement that provision under Rule 35.
Even if the parties' agreed upon sentence of probation for a term of ten years
were illegal, then the correct remedy still would not be to reduce Villavicencio's term of
probation. If any term of the plea agreement is held illegal, then the plea agreement will
be rendered inoperable. See Haessly v. Safeco Title Ins. Co. of Idaho, 121 Idaho 463,
465, 825 P.2d 1119, 1121 (1992) (citations omitted).

Where a plea agreement is

inoperable, the proper remedy is to rescind the agreement and return the parties to the

status quo ante. See Bernard & Son, Inc. v. Akins, 109 Idaho 466, 470-71, 708 P.2d
871, 87 5-76 ( 1985) (where contract has been rendered inoperable, rescission is the
proper remedy).
But the Court need not reach such a drastic remedy in this case.

When a

sentence is illegal, the remedy provided by Idaho Criminal Rule 35 is to correct the
illegal sentence.

I.C.R. 35(a).

Under Idaho Criminal Rule 11, the district court is

required to "implement the disposition provided for in the plea agreement." The district
court can accomplish both in this case by resentencing Villavicencio to probation for a
term of ten years, consistent with the plea agreement, through consecutive probations,
consistent with Idaho law. See Horejs, 143 Idaho at 266, 141 P.3d at 1135. The district
court's amended judgment should be vacated and this case remanded for the court to
resentence Villavicencio consistent with the parties' binding Rule 11 plea agreement.
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CONCLUSION

The state respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's amended
judgment and remand this case for resentencing consistent with the parties' binding
Rule 11 plea agreement.

DATED this 20th day of November, 2014.

Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 20th day of November, 2014, served a true
and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy
addressed to:
SARA B. THOMAS
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.

Deputy Attorney General
RJS/pm
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